Traditional corporatist groups such as business groups and unions still play an important role in many countries, and the rumors exaggerates the decline of corporatist structures. Denmark strong unions, a strong parliament, and frequent minority governments makes it more difficult for citizen groups to be heard.
Introduction
Despite profound socio-economic and political changes, neo-corporatist systems in Europe have remained relatively resilient since the 1970s in terms of interest group intermediation and policymaking (Armingeon 2011; ) . Interest groups remain indispensable for governments in the implementation of public policy even if many governments have attempted to grant greater autonomy to organized interests. While much has been written on the fate of corporatist structures and actors, less is known about the integration of citizen groups in political and administrative decision-making processes.
The traditional corporatist partners are unions and business associations but also include professional groups and institutional groups. Through corporatist intermediation, the most powerful organizations have traditionally enjoyed a particularly privileged position. In the European context, Lowery et al. (2015 Lowery et al. ( : 1221 note that corporatist intermediation systems are, by definition, the ultimate form of bias, as they clearly privilege venue access and policy influence to a limited number of favoured groups. In this light, one might speculate as to how different corporatist heritages affect the advent and possible political positions of citizen groups that enter the decision-making arena from somewhere other than society's economic sector. Berry (1999) claims that citizens are increasingly engaged in non-economic groups, such as environmental groups,, consumer rights, elderly groups, and the promotion of civil rights. This raises questions as to whether their chances of being integrated into the political and administrative decision-making processes are affected by the prevailing national corporatist traditions.
This cross-country study compares the presence of traditional insiders (business associations, trade unions, professional groups and institutional groups) and citizen groups (public interest, identity and religious groups) in the administrative and parliamentary venues in the decade 1975-1985 versus 2010 in two different corporatist settings. It is based on comparative data on access of interest groups to the two venues. Access focuses on presence or absence of groups in decisionmaking structures. It does not capture the influence of groups in policy processes. Access to institutional venues is a precondition for any policy influence and political power, however, for which reason it deserves attention (Eising 2007 ).
The next section introduces the literatures on corporatism and political opportunity structures as a theoretical point of departure and develops two main expectations: First, citizen groups have strengthened their positions in decision-making processes of both countries. Second, Swiss citizen groups have been more successful than their Danish counterparts in gaining access to administrative and parliamentary venues. We then present the empirical set-up and the study's data.
Finally, we discuss the main findings and put them into perspective.
Theoretical framework and hypotheses: common trends, different political opportunity structures
Corporatism is defined as the 'institutionalized and privileged integration of organized interests in the preparation and/or implementation of public policies' (Christiansen et al. 2010: 28) . The logic of privileging some interest groups at the cost of others is straightforward: In a corporatist system, policymakers need a selected group with whom they can deliberate, negotiate and bargain. Over time, some groups succeed in becoming accepted partners that can be trusted to engage in ongoing relationships. Groups enjoying such privileges will fight to maintain their monopoly representation by keeping competitors and newcomers away from the decision-making arenas.
The stock of all mobilized groups is an imperfect mirror of the society from which they emanate, as political access for these groups is biased (Lowery et al. 2015; ) . The heavy weight carried by unions, business associations and institutional groups in the first three quarters of the 20 th century reflects the enormous societal efforts invested in the development of modern agriculture, industries and services in the private sector, and education, health and social services in the public sector. The development of modern production systems mobilized groups based on economic and reproductive issues.
While economic associations remain important, the mobilization of groups has shifted over the past four decades. We have witnessed the advent of new values (e.g., environmentalism), new cleavages (e.g., authoritarian-libertarian) and new political issues (e.g., immigration, morality or cultural issues), all of which are not or loosely related to neo-corporatist issues. Even if collective action problems are more difficult to overcome for groups mobilized on these bases, new groups are actually formed (see Jordan et al. 2012 for the UK and USA; Fisker 2015 for Denmark; Gava et al. 2016 for Switzerland). Citizen groups may not be as strong as economic associations in terms of delivering expertise, but they do possess some of the resources demanded by decision-makers (e.g., information about public mood, legitimization of political decisions and electoral support, cf. , and they challenge traditional corporatist structures.
In order to understand what can happen when a corporatist system confronts new groups from outside the economic sector, we draw on literatures on corporatism and political opportunity structures (POS). We compare two corporatist countries with different POS at two different times.
We argue that their corporatist structures have been exposed to roughly the same pressures, and we then ask whether their POS affect the opportunities available to citizen groups to gain access to decision-making arenas. We thus exploit a co-variational approach (cf. Blatter and Haverland 2012: 33ff.): If we observe co-variation between the access of citizen groups and the differences in POS and there is no plausible co-variation between citizen group access and other control variables, we may conclude that the POS probably have an impact on the rise of citizen groups.
Common trends: The rise of citizen groups and pressure on neo-corporatist systems
Interest groups are important for decision-makers because they can deliver valued goods in exchange for access to decision-making arenas. Defined simply, access goods may be either information or political support/resistance . Economic groups obviously control both resources. Citizen groups have unique knowledge about the segment of society they represent, and they may support or oppose decision-makers' agendas in important issues, such as environmental policy, consumer matters or social policies.
Between-group competition is supposedly less intense in corporatist systems than in pluralist environments because some insider groups have exploited their access goods to obtain privileged access to political actors and tend to be more resourceful in terms of members, finance and expertise. Citizen groups enjoy less favourable access to decision-making arenas in corporatist countries than in pluralist countries. The propensity to form citizen groups is lower and the costs of access to decision-making venues higher in corporatist systems (see Fisker 2015) . We cannot test this claim here because we examin two corporatist systems. We can, however, investigate what happens when corporatism comes under pressure. This happened in Denmark and Switzerland during the last four decades. Besides the affirmation of new citizen groups, four transformations at work represent more favourable opportunities for citizen groups to gain access to decision-makers.
First, retrenchment policies have come to take up much more space on the government agenda. Evidence from Denmark (Blom-Hansen et al. 2012:) and Switzerland (Häusermann et al. 2004; Sciarini 2014) shows that retrenchment decisions are difficult to carry out within corporatist structures, partly due to the related logic of exchange between corporatist partners.
1 On the other hand, such decisions put corporatist actors, especially trade unions, under pressure: retrenchment policies possibly give specific citizen groups (humanitarian groups, disability organizations, or associations for the elderly) incentives to mobilize against cuts and program curtailments.
Second, the mediatization of politics implies that the media are increasingly shaping political processes (Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999) . Clear traces of mediatization are found in Denmark (GreenPedersen and Stubager 2010) and Switzerland (Landerer 2014) . Mediatized processes contrast closed and secret negotiations among neo-corporatist partners, which have a low news value. Mediatization is therefore increasingly incompatible with corporatist policymaking. Mediatized policy processes may enhance citizen groups who have a comparative (but not absolute) advantage in gaining media access (Binderkrantz et al. 2015: 105-6 ).
Third, a re-parliamentarization process with possible consequences for group advocacy strategies has been at work. The famous Rokkan quote 'votes count, resources decide ' (1966: 105-6) hinted that the administrative venue was more important than the parliamentary venue for corporatist groups. This may have been true, but we observe a relative shift in the balance between the two venues (Rommetvedt et al. 2012) . The Swiss and Danish parliaments have increased their power vis-à-vis the government. They have introduced permanent committees, and MPs have specialized on selected policy areas. Interest groups -including citizen groups -are thus expected to invest more intensively in the parliamentary venue because of MPs' increased competencies Sciarini 2015 et al.) . Like the media arena, the parliamentary arena grants citizen groups a comparative advantage in terms of access because they can offer parliamentarians information and support (or resistance) (Binderkrantz et al. 2015: 105-6 ).
Fourth, the Europeanization of public policies has moved some decision-making power from the national to the EU level, and groups have increasingly been forced to orient themselves towards Brussels (Christensen 2010) . Switzerland has adopted parts of EU law in order to be part of the Single
Market (Gava and Varone 2014) . Swiss decision-making processes are also directly affected by Europeanization, as is obviously also the case for EU member state Denmark. In Europeanized policies, pre-parliamentary negotiations between national neo-corporatist actors are weakened (Mach et al. 2003; Sciarini 2014) , parliamentary oversight of Europeanized processes is increasing over time, and citizen groups aim at contributing to this scrutiny exercise (Gava et al. 2016) .
The increasing role of citizen groups since the 1970s and the structural pressures on corporatist regimes have contributed to transforming the policy-making process towards increased openness to citizen group participation. The joint effect leads to the first hypothesis, according to which present-day citizen groups in Switzerland and Denmark have better access to political arenas than in the 1970s and 1980s.
Differences in political opportunity structures
While our first hypothesis postulates that citizen groups challenge the corporatist groups' strong positions in both countries, the next question is how this challenge is spelled out in two corporatist societies with differentpolitical opportunity structures.
The POS literature analyses the variations with which social movements are integrated into social and political structures. Kitschelt (1986: 63) points out a number of factors that determine the openness of a political system towards new demands from organized interests. To these factors belong the patterns of intermediation between interest groups and decision-makers and the extent to which they are 'pluralist' or not. Kriesi et al. (1992) distinguish between three POS properties that determine how a political system includes or excludes social movements: formal institutional structure, informal procedures and strategies with respect to how challengers are met and, finally, the 'configuration of power relevant for the confrontation with challengers' (Kriesi et al. 1992: 220) .
By the latter, they refer to strategies pursued by existing insiders (i.e., corporatist groups) and their possible effect on the challengers' prospects for success (i.e., citizen groups).
Despite similar corporatist characteristics, Denmark and Switzerland have important differences in their POS that might affect the political integration of citizen groups.
First, they differ in how they configure power. Whereas Denmark represents the social version of democratic corporatism (strong labour movement and a strong social democratic party), Switzerland belongs to the liberal version, with weak unions and politically strong business associations (Katzenstein 1985: 104-5, 129 ).
Danish corporatism dates back to the early 1900s, when labour unions had grown strong enough to enter into agreements with the main employers' organization on basic labour market rules Danish social corporatism grants trade unions a much stronger position than in Switzerland.
Since strong unions already represent or incorporate the demands of some citizen interests, it is probably more difficult for Danish groups to win access than for Swiss citizen groups. The administrative venue is often considered the most important, as this is where groups may achieve the strongest positions via membership of public committees, regular negotiations with civil servants and so forth. Expertise concerning the government machinery and putting legislation together rests with the administration, and groups may be involved in formulating political advice, preparing legislative decisions or implementing policy programmes. Groups also supply politically relevant information and support that is valuable for administrators because of pending political processes in and around the parliament.
The parliamentary venue is also important, but far fewer MPs are policy specialists, which renders it more difficult for groups to establish strong relations with MPs and, thus, gain a hand in setting the agenda and formulating policy . Some groups may establish close relations with MPs by having them on their board or payroll. Table 1 here Data capture two main categories of groups. Corporatist groups include (1) unions, (2) business associations, (3) institutional groups (e.g., Local Government Denmark) and (4) professional groups (e.g., Swiss Medical Association). Citizen groups include (1) public interest groups promoting common goods (e.g., World Wildlife Fund), (2) identity groups representing a delimited constituency (e.g., women, tenants, minorities, patients), (3) religious groups (e.g., Swiss Evangelical Alliance) and (4) leisure groups (e.g., scout groups).
Empirical analysis

Administrative venue
In both countries, committees have been an important venue for corporatist policymaking throughout the 20 th century, which has been viewed as the strongest indicator of the strength of corporatism. To the extent that numbers count, the 1970s is the strongest hour of both committee systems (Christiansen et al. 2010; Germann 1985) .
Two major changes have occurred in the committee system since the 1970s, (cf. Table 2 Switzerland has also seen a dramatic drop in the number of extra-parliamentary committees, and they play a less important role in the legislative process because of the revalorization of the parliament and the increasing difficulty reaching compromises during the pre-parliamentary phase (Häusermann et al. 2004; Sciarini 2014) . Contrary to Denmark, however, the number of group representatives has significantly declined in line with the reduced number of committees. A second indicator of the relation between groups and bureaucracy is how interest groups react to administrative consultations. In both countries, the government sends out draft bills for comments before they are presented to parliament. Invitations are sent out broadly, mostly to public authorities and groups, and it is also possible for non-invited groups to respond.
The consultation procedure is probably more important in Switzerland than in Denmark because of the optional referendum; i.e. the opportunity to contest the parliament's decision in a popular vote. The aim of this external consultation is, thus, to 'test' the political acceptability of a legislative proposal by the main stakeholders. If key actors voice strong opposition to the proposal, the bill will most likely be revised in order to avoid an ex post optional referendum.
Unfortunately, we do not have data for the 1970s. 
Parliamentary venue
The parliamentary venue is also important for groups, as it has the power to amend proposals put forward by the government and ultimately passes legislation. Groups that failed to affect administrative proposals and decisions may compensate by trying to affect MPs' legislative behaviour. Some groups may have privileged relations to parties because they share similar goals or to individual MPs because they entertain direct relations, such as employment relations or occupying leading positions.
As in other neo-corporatist countries, major Danish and Swiss parties have historically had close relations to economic associations, either business associations, trade unions or farmers'
associations. This common legacy should, however, be nuanced concerning the statute of the (Table 4 below).
The two countries also differ considerably in terms of leading positions held by MPs. In Not surprisingly, Table 5 shows that the mobilization pattern in 1975 was dominated by corporatist groups. However, unions and institutional groups are heavily overrepresented compared to their population share, while professional associations are underrepresented. The picture has changed significantly in 2010. Corporatist groups in both countries are now underrepresented, whereas citizen groups are overrepresented. For corporatist groups, two parliamentary committees are of particular importance: the economic affairs and taxation committee (CEAT) and the social security and health affairs committee (CSSH). 5 The number of leading positions in citizen groups occupied by MPs has increased in both committees, but much more in the CSSH than in the CEAT (+37.4% versus 13.4%, see Table 5 ). In 2010, the CEAT members were much more connected to corporatist groups than the average MP access to Parliament, it should be nuanced according to the domains of responsibility of the committees. Corporatist groups remain overrepresented in the committees dealing with economic and social policies.
The revalorization and increasing importance of the Parliament, especially its legislative committees, have induced groups to reinforce their presence in the parliamentary venue. They follow a deliberate strategy to 'send' and recruit MPs in relevant parliamentary committees to intensify their influence in this venue ).
Comparison and discussion
The empirical data largely support our hypotheses. Our first expectation -that citizen groups increase their presence -is generally supported, even if more for the parliamentary than for the administrative venue. Concerning the latter, we observe a significant decline in the number of extraparliamentary committees in both countries. As for the composition of these traditional corporatist structures, changes are not so notable, and both countries exhibit similar trends. In Denmark, Table 2 ). The more strongly mobilized Swiss citizen groups are also materialized for administrative consultations. However, the greatest differences are found in the strategies of citizen groups towards the Parliament. Even if access is measured differently in the two countries, the growing presence of Swiss citizen groups in decision-making arenas appears much more outspoken than the Danish.
Conclusion
This study is innovative, as it combines the literature on corporatism and political opportunity structure to cover the rise of citizen groups and the pressures on corporatist systems at two points in time with a 30-40-year interval.
As expected, we observe a general trend towards institutionalization of citizen group participation in administrative and parliamentary venues, which reflects a pluralization of both corporatist systems. Corporatist groups remain the most active by far, but citizen groups have won greater shares of access to decision-makers. This is likely indicative of a more general trend affecting Western societies, including the two countries included in our study.
The case studies on Denmark and Switzerland reveal that the destabilization of traditional corporatist structures has contributed to the affirmation and clearer recognition of new citizen groups highlighted by stronger presence in both the administrative and parliamentary venues.
However, increased representation in corporatist structures does not automatically imply more political influence for citizen groups, as corporatist arrangements are playing a less important role in policy-making processes. On this point, it should again be stressed that our comparative study only captures the presence of interest groups and does not allow us to draw conclusions on changes in the power of both categories of interest groups. To address this question, we should consider the power balance within corporatist arrangements and in other institutional venues and policy arenas.
In the new context of mediatized politics, for instance, traditional corporatist insiders, especially business interests, must adapt their political strategies. Theys cannot rely only on their dominant position in the administrative venue but have to diversify their strategy in order to be more present in the increasingly important parliamentary venue, in the media or at the international level. Some emblematic examples illustrate this trend, such as the media presence of the recently founded think tank Avenir Suisse, financed by multinational companies, or the massive presence of the Danish Federation of Industries in the media (Binderkrantz 2014, 192) .
The corporatist heritages of both countries probably reduce the speed with which citizen groups can access decision-makers. Some group entrepreneurs may renounce start-up groups to whom they ascribe low success probability for influence and organizational survival. However, Leisure education closely related to the labour unions is another example (Pedersen 1989: 271f .) that may leave fewer opportunities for non-labour movement suppliers of leisure education. Danish labour unions were more than just unions; they became involved in people's lives in many ways.
Finally, the more professionalized Danish Parliament and the almost endless minority governmentssome of which are weak -may be less in demand for citizen group inputs in the fight for intragovernment discipline and government survival.
The present study also provides evidence of important changes in presence and mobilization of interest groups in the administrative and parliamentary venues of the law-making process. This finding paves the way for further studies focusing on 'multi-venue' strategies of interest groups.
Concretely, it would make sense to compare specific legislative processes in Switzerland and Denmark (see Pedersen et al. 2014) Interviews with both corporatist and citizen groups are required to identify their advocacy strategies.
In particular, it is worth investigating if increased presence of citizen groups in the parliamentary venue is a deliberate strategy and if it increases policy influence.
Finally, we need to explore if the transformation of corporatist arrangements is similar in all policy domains. Such a policy-contextualized approach raises the question of whether or not citizen groups compete with traditional corporatist associations on similar policy issues or if they rather mobilize on different topics. Differences could also relate to differences regarding the mobilization and access of corporatist versus citizen groups could be more important between policy domains within the same country than across countries.
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1 Conversely Schnyder and Jackson (2013) stress the dialectical and paradoxical connection between neo-liberal reforms and the preservation of corporatism in Sweden and Germany.
association (USAM) and the Swiss farmers' association (USP) were all members of this committee. 
